EReform

Electoral Reform in Canada

The topic for the Institute’s twelfth forum was Electoral Reform in Canada. The session consisted of a major presentation on the subject by Dr. W. Glenn Harewood, Toronto Educator, Former Member of the Canada Refugee Board, Politician, and Member of the Institute. His presentation was followed by a response given by Dr. Giuseppe Gori, Leader of the Family Coalition Party of Ontario, Businessman, and at the time a Member of the Institute’s Advisory Council.

Their presentations appear below in their entirety.

Paradoxes, Democracy, and Electoral Reform
Dr. W. Glenn Harewood
Metamode Institute on Public Policy
"The most appropriate system for an electorate is that system that best satisfies those requirements that are considered to be the most important by the electorate."

Today we live in a parliamentary democracy which nurtures paradoxes. We demand our individual rights and freedoms, but deny the rights and freedoms of the collective of individuals, the majority of community. For example, the individual rights of a 17-year-old "gay" male to take his male boy friend to his high school prom are pitted against the collective rights of the group of individuals who see themselves as having the right to practise and uphold the tenets and credo of the Catholic Church.

We accept that each individual who buys a one-dollar lottery ticket has a chance at winning millions of dollars while the odds are that, for that one individual to win millions of dollars, many more individuals--the collective of individuals--must lose their one dollar.

We set up a system at the Olympics where 10 people compete against each other in a 100-metre dash, but accept only the first person who covers the distance in the least amount of time, as winner.

At auctions we accept that each person in a collective of bidders has a chance to bid on the price of an item, but then we only accept sale to the highest bid (bidder) for that particular item.

We accept and follow a similar system in politics in Canada where one representative from two or more political parties competes against another for one seat, but if the collective of voters repeatedly votes for a party that's not to the individual's liking, then we tend to suggest that the results are not as democratic as they should be. Then we start looking at changing the voting system rather than looking at other variables.

We live in an age where every one talks about democracy and democratic rights without a clearly defined concept of what democracy, democratic rights really are.

Democracy has been defined and continues to be defined by different people in different ways. A few examples suffice:

Perecles (430 BC), Greek Athenian leader, held that democracy is associated or linked to toleration--possessing the ability to be tolerant to others, and to ideas other than one's own. However, he made no special claims for majority rule.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) held that "man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains"; that all limitations imposed by government or other institutions on the exercise of one's individual rights and freedoms should be lifted because government "ties up" or chains one's freedoms; that individuals have rights that belong to them, and these rights are independent of any interference from government.

John Locke (1632-1704) held that men naturally possess certain large rights the chief being life, liberty, and property; that rulers derived their power only from the consent of the people; that government should be like a contract between the rulers and their subjects: the people give up certain of their rights in return for just rule, and the ruler should hold his power only so long as he uses it justly.

Montesquieu (1689 -1755) held that the abuse of power, slavery, and intolerance was evil; and that government can avoid such evils by separating power into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, by governing with honour rather than through fear, and by upholding human dignity.

Based upon such a solid, rich background of philosophical concepts, democracy may also be defined as government not only by the people, of the people, for the people, but for the collective good of a majority of the people. The minority is not forgotten, but accepts the majority concept.

But there is a difference between direct democracy as it was practised in the Greek city-states, and representative democracy of the 21st Century. Even in the Greek city-states, however, all the people in those states could not vote for any particular person or measure. Voting was limited to citizens and males only.

One should note that political stalwarts like Plato and Aristotle did not approve of democracy as we think and approve of it today. Plato disapproved of democracy because he thought that democracy would "hand control of the government to populist demagogues."¹ (Do we see any evidence of this today?) Aristotle disapproved of democracy because he believed that "government by the people was, in practice, government by the poor who could be expected to expropriate the (wealth) of the rich." ²

Aristotle did, however, support majority rule. He believed that the majority ought to be sovereign. Could it be that we got the concept of majority rule from Aristotle and his contemporaries?

Further, the relatively small populations of the Greek city-states, and the almost absolute homogeneity of the population of those states, made it easier for the whole community of citizens to arrive at a decision on which they were to be governed.

Today, in our densely populated, heterogeneous, pluralistic societies, it is very difficult for a government to arrive at a clear-cut decision on any government matter, by a mere vote by the whole community. There are many different opinions on any one subject held by each individual, or group of individuals. Thus, in order to accommodate as many of these opinions/positions as possible, we find it easiest to have individuals come together in groups which, in turn, take up a particular stance on one or more issues that are presumably important to the community as a whole.

These groups may or are, for practical purposes, reduced to political parties. Political parties then put forward one individual from a designated constituency or riding, or community of individuals, to represent that party and the ideas proposed by that party.

Thus, we use a representative who takes a particular position on issues that are deemed important to the community, to represent that whole community of individuals. In order to satisfy the tenets of democracy, one allows as much choice as possible. But choice cannot be ad infinitum. One also allows that a majority of individuals who collectively favour one representative's position as against the positions of other representatives is the one who is chosen to represent the whole community. Does the fact that every single individual in the community did not vote for the representative chosen by a majority of voters, mean that he/she cannot represent the minority who did not vote for him/her? For example, can someone living in anyone of the 101 Ontario constituencies, who may have voted other than Liberal in the last federal elections, not seek and get help or assistance from the elected Liberal representative?

If we accept the proposition that we who live in a pluralistic society cannot live without government, and then we must accept that, according to John Locke, although government, rulers, derived their power from the consent of the people, the people entered into a contract with their rulers, whereby, they give up certain of their rights in return for just rule.

Just rule must take into consideration the common good--the good of the people as a whole as opposed to the singular, individual good of one person. We must also accept that choice is not infinite; neither is the number of political parties in a democratic community, nor the elective instru-ments for choosing representatives infinite.

Democracy implies choice. Choice is only meaningful if alternatives exist, and if differences are real. Differences are real only if choice is encouraged and meaningful only if choice is genuine and real.

How do these concepts apply to the political party voting system in Canada or to voting systems around the world?

Let us look now, via summaries, at the major voting systems that are used in a democratic society, to execute the choosing of the representatives to parliaments.

Four Major Types of Systems

Following are summaries of the four current voting systems which are used, world-wide, in electing representatives to serve in the various parliaments of the world.

I draw heavily on a research paper produced by Gerard Newman of the Information and Research Services, Statistic Group, of the Australian Electoral Commission.³ Newman's paper is adapted, changed to make certain concepts clearer and various junctures interspersed with questions and comments designed to generate more questions from the reader about the whole process of electoral and parliamentary reform.

In this document, Newman provides a very comprehensive examination of the various electoral systems, but uses the Australian electoral voting system as a model. Newman's paper is solely concerned with the mechanics of translating votes into seats, but does not cover other aspects of the electoral process, for example, candidate selection, the role of parties, or manipulation of the electoral process.

According to Newman, the purpose of an electoral system is to translate the will of the electorate, as expressed through the ballot box, into members of a legislative body. The ways this can be achieved are many and varied. Electoral systems throughout the world range from very simple First-Past-The-Post system to quite complex arrangements of a number of differing systems.

But can a plurality of wills of the electorate be ever equitably translated into seats on a one-seat-to "n" number of voters’ ratio/basis?

Gerard Newman lists the following as worthwhile in considering some of the basic requirements of a truly representative voting system.

An electoral system should:

• result in a legislature that reflects the electorate's wishes;

• result in a government that reflects the majority opinion of the electorate;

• allow for stable government;

• ensure the election of members whose personal qualities best fit them for legislative responsibilities;

• be easily understood by the electorate;

• ensure a quick result;

• allow effective constituent representation;

• allow elector choice of candidates.

Newman goes on to say that:

"…in considering the above requirements it should be noted that some may not be compatible and that not all will be present in any individual system. The absence of some of these requirements in a system should not necessarily mean that the system does not have merit. Electoral systems should vary from country to country depending upon the individual circumstances prevailing at that time and place."⁴

Newman further admits that:

"…the electoral system adopted by a country probably depends more on the country's political tradition rather than on any abstract consideration of the relative merits of different systems. Countries with a British political heritage are more inclined to plurality and majoritorian systems while those of a European heritage are more inclined towards proportional representation."⁵

Then Newman goes on to concede that:

"…as no one system incorporates all the requirements described above, there would appear to be a strong argument for a legislative electoral system to be based on a combination of systems. However, this solution has not won general acceptance as only the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Japanese House of Councillors use a combination of systems."⁶

The question that I ask is why has a mixed or combination system not been widely accepted across democratically run countries?

A significant feature of the electoral systems used in Australia is the use of one system for the Lower House of the Parliament and the use of an alternative system for the Upper House.

Does this combination system, with one type at one level, and another at a second level make the functioning of parliament--of arriving at decisions that benefit the community at large--any more democratic than before?

1. Plurality Systems

A Plurality system awards the seat to the candidate who receives the most votes regardless of whether the candidate receives a majority of votes. The Plurality system is almost always used in conjunction with single member constituencies, but can be adapted for multi-member constituencies.

The Plurality system or First-Past-The-Post system awards the seat to the candidate who polls the most votes. Plurality systems are widely used, but are largely restricted to the United Kingdom, Canada and the Unites States of America. Plurality systems are commonly used for the election of Heads of State where only one candidate is to be elected.

The variation of the First-Past-The-Post system used in Japan is referred to as the Single Non-Transferable Vote. This system is used to elect constituency members to both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. In both chambers members are elected from multi-member constituencies. Electors have one vote and candidates with the highest number of votes are elected.

Other variations of the First-Past-The-Post system involving multi-member constituencies are the Block Vote and the Limited Vote systems. In the Block Vote system the elector has as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. Once again the candidates with the highest amount of votes are elected regardless of whether they receive a majority of votes. The Block Vote system is mainly used in some local authority elections in Britain. The Block Vote system works best when the candidates are independents. When the candidates are members of parties, and party voting is strong, the Block Vote system tends to exaggerate the characteristics of plurality systems by giving a bonus to the largest party. If three candidates are to be elected, it is possible for all three candidates from the same party to be elected with only a small plurality.

In the Limited Vote system the elector has fewer votes than there are candidates to be elected. The intention of this is to limit the number of seats that can be won by one party. However, the system does not overcome the problems of the block vote and can be manipulated by parties estimating the number of votes their candidates expect to gain and by nominating an optional number of candidates.

Approval Voting is an American initiative designed to overcome some of the problems of plurality systems for single member constituencies. As the name suggests this system allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they approve of. Thus, if five candidates are standing and a voter approves of three but not the other two candidates, then he can vote for the three candidates he approves of. Only one vote can be cast for each approved candidate. The candidate approved by the most voters, i.e., with the most votes, wins. A majority of votes is not required for election.

The perceived advantages of Approval Voting over other plurality systems include:

(a) increased flexibility given to voters as voters can vote for all candidates they find acceptable, not just one candidate;

(b) increased voter turnout as voters are better able to exercise a choice;

(c) would help elect the candidate with the greatest overall support not just the candidate with the largest number of votes;

(d) and would give greater validity (due) to minority candidates as voters would be more likely to vote for minor party candidates knowing that their vote would no longer be wasted; not affected by the number of candidates who are standing for election.

Advantages of First-Past-The-Post System

The First-Past-The-Post system is widely seen to be unfair and many attempts have been made to improve or replace it in countries where it is in use. However, the system does have a number of advantages.

First, when operated with single member constituencies, it provides for a direct relationship between the member of the legislature and the local constituency.

Second, because elections are contested at the constituency level, there can be a degree of local control over the party's choice of candidate, and parties must take some account of the constituency's wishes when selecting a candidate.

Third, the system elects the candidate who receives the largest number of votes. Candidates cannot be elected as a result of the transfer of a third or fourth preference, thus defeating the candidate with the largest number of first preference votes.

Fourth, the system is straightforward and easy to understand. Electors are not required to choose from vast lists of candidates or to exercise preferences they may not have. The system is uncomplicated and produces a speedy outcome.

Fifth, the system allows electors to directly choose the government and not be subject to backroom wheeling and dealing that can occur when a large number of parties are elected to the legislature.

Sixth, there is less opportunity for minority parties to be given power in proportionate to their electoral support.

Seventh, there is less likelihood of a proliferation of minor parties, which may make the formation of stable governments difficult.

Finally, because elections are contested at the constituency level there is a greater possibility of outstanding candidates being elected regardless of party support.

Disadvantages of First-Past-The-Post System

The main criticisms of the First-Past-The-Post system are as follows.

First, it cannot be relied upon to provide a legislature reflecting the various shades of opinion expressed at the election and it does not necessarily place in power a government supported by the majority of the electorate.

Second, the First-Past-The-Post system is a winner-take-all system that can deny representation in the legislature to quite substantial levels of minority opinion and can provide large differences in the number of representatives elected with only a small difference in the number of votes obtained through the operation of the winning bonus.

Again, is it absolutely necessary to have all levels of minority opinion represented in a limited numbered legislature? Is failure to have these minority opinions represented deny the democratic rights of the minorities? Does a vote for a majority representative at a specific moment in time mean that that particular representative cannot ever represent the will of the minority who did not vote for him/her? Does under representation necessarily mean that minority parties are not heard? Or that their views are not necessarily translated into law? Are minority parties not part of the opposition (to the government) parties?

2. Majoritorian Systems

Majoritorian systems require the winning candidate to receive a majority (more than half) of the votes cast to ensure election. This is generally achieved either through a second ballot or by means of preference voting, or an Alternative Vote. Second Ballot voting systems are used to elect members from single member constituencies. An Alternative Voting system can be used for both single and multi-member electorates.

Who determines what a majority is? Does an arbitrary picked number above 50% represent any more a majority than any other picked number?

In the Second Ballot system, a second election is held a short time after the first election if no candidate gains more than 50% of the votes in the first election.

When Second Ballot systems are used, the number of candidates who are eligible to enter the second election is limited either by (1) number--the two candidates who receive the highest vote--or by (2) some threshold--only candidates receiving over a set percentage of the vote. Sec-ond Ballot systems are more likely to be used in presidential elections rather than for legislative elections. The western European countries of Austria, France, and Portugal use the Second Ballot system to elect their heads-of-state.

How well does a Second Ballot system represent the same voters as those in the first ballot? Would voters have voted the same way on the first ballot as they voted on the second ballot? How democratic is the process if one votes for a series of different candidates on the second of their votes?

The Second Ballot system prevents the election of any candidate without a majority of the vote, thus overcoming one of the main criticisms of plurality systems. However, the second ballot system introduces a complication into the voting system: the requirement for a second ballot results in (a) a greater expense for the candidates and parties involved, (b) greater inconvenience to the electors, and (c) delays the result of the election, thus causing uncertainty. The requirement for a second ballot may also influence the final result as electors may use the first ballot as a form of protest vote.

The Alternative Vote system removes the potential confusion of the Second Ballot system by allowing the voter to indicate how he or she would vote if his or her first choice candidate were defeated and he or she had to choose again from the remaining candidates.

The system operates by asking voters to number the candidates in order of their choice. If none of the candidates receives a majority, more than 50% of first preference votes, then the candidate with the lowest first preference vote is eliminated, and his or her votes are redistributed to the remaining candidates on the basis of the second choices. Further candidates are eliminated until one candidate reaches a majority.

How democratic is it to take 'a bunch of voters' votes and redistribute those votes to the remaining candidates? Would the voters who cast those votes redistribute the votes in the same manner?

Advantages of the Alternative Vote System

First, it requires the winning candidate to obtain a majority of the vote. A situation is therefore avoided where a candidate can be elected on a little over one third of the vote, and where there are three candidates who are relatively evenly supported by the voters.

Second, the system also overcomes the problem of vote splitting: voters can exercise a choice between two similar candidates without the fear that a third, unacceptable, candidate may be elected.

Third, the Alternative Vote system provides a dampening effect on the Plurality system's characteristics wherein there is a concentration of party representation on a geographical basis, and a tendency to provide an outcome of exaggerated majorities. Although party representation under the Alternative Vote system is more clearly aligned to voter support than under Plurality systems, the Alternative Vote system still produces working majorities and thus provides for stable government.

Fourth, the Alternative Vote system is relatively easy to understand and can produce relatively speedy results.

Disadvantages of the Alternative Vote System

The principal disadvantage of the Alternative Vote system and of Plurality systems as well, is that neither system necessarily reflects the wishes of the electorate.

Second, the degree of proportionality (i.e., members elected in proportion to voter support) is greater under Alternative Vote than under Plurality, but it does not achieve the degree of proportionality of Proportional Representation systems.

Third, the system is still subject to the winning bonus phenomenon and can also result in the party winning the highest number of votes still not receiving the largest number of seats--although this factor is largely dependent upon the geographic spread of party support and on the mix of parties contesting the election.

Can one measure the "reflection of the wishes of the electorate" in terms of pure absolute numbers?

Fourth, the system can often be unpredictable in its practical application, and can yield a result which may see the least unfavored rather than the most popular candidate elected. In an election where there is a political situation consisting of parties considered to be on the left, right and centre of the political spectrum, the centre party could receive preferences of both the left and right parties on the basis of being the least unfavorable option available, and thus become the winner.

Fifth, the Alternative Vote system has also been criticized because it requires voters to express a preference for candidates where the voter may not wish to do so. This situation can be overcome by allowing voters the option of not expressing preferences if they so desire. But then, does this not defeat the concept and purpose of "alternativeness?"

3. Proportional Representation

Proportional Representation systems are widely used in Europe and in Australia for upper houses. Proportional Representation systems attempt to relate the allocation of seats as closely as possible to the distribution of votes. Many Proportional Representation systems have been developed to overcome the problems of proportionality that are associated with single member constituencies which use either plurality or majoritorian systems. Multi-member constituencies where there is more than one vacancy are necessary for proportional representation to work well. Constituencies can range from the whole country or state to parts of the country.

Proportional Representation systems can be broadly grouped into two categories: (a) List systems and (b) The Single-Transferable Vote system. In turn, List systems can be further divided into (i) Largest Remainder and (ii) Highest Average categories.

List systems may or may not allow the elector to choose between candidates of the same party. List systems can be either (1) closed, allowing no choice at all; (2) flexible, where the voter can vote for the party or a candidate; (3) open, where there is no party vote, but candidates listed in order; or (4) free, where the candidates are not placed in any order by the parties.

The basic concept of Proportional Representation systems is to allocate seats in a legislature or Houses of Parliament in a relationship which is proportional to the number of votes cast in the election. To achieve this requirement a number of different and complex computational arrangements have been devised. These arrangements may or may not include the use of a quota. A quota in this context is the number of votes required to obtain a seat. The simplest method of determining a quota is to divide the number of valid votes by the number of seats to be allocated. This method is often referred to as the Hare quota.

Three alternatives to the Hare quota exist: (1) The Hagen-bach-Bischoff quota, in which the number of votes is divided by the number of seats plus one; (2) the Droop quota, in which the number of votes is divided by the number of seats plus one and adding one to the quotient; (3) and the Imperial quota, in which the number of votes is divided by the number of seats plus two.

The Largest Remainder system favours smaller parties over larger parties when using the Hare quota. The relative importance of remainders in the allocation of seats can be reduced by the use of a lower quota (Hagenbach-Bischoff or Droop). Lower quotas result in more seats being allocated on the basis of parties receiving a full quota and less being allocated by remainders. However, the use of a lower quota does not always overcome the proportionality problem of the Largest Remainder system.

To overcome problems associated with the Largest Remainder system, the Highest Average system was devised. The object of the Highest Average system is to ensure that when all seats have been allocated the average number of votes required to win one seat shall be as near as possible the same for each party.

The Highest Average system can be used with or without a quota. When used with a quota, the system is sometimes referred to as a Hagenbach-Bischoff system. The system derives its name from the method of allocation of seats to parties. Under the system each party's votes are divided by a series of divisors to produce an average vote. The party with the highest averages votes after each stage of the process is allocated a seat. After a party has been allocated a seat, its votes are then divided by the next divisor. The Highest Average system has a number of different variations, depending upon the divisors used and whether a quota is used or not. The d'Hondt version uses the numbers one, two, three, four, etc. as its divisors.

The form of Proportional Representation familiar to most Australians is the Single-Transferable Vote system used in elections for the Senate, the Legislative Councils of New South Wales, South Australian and Western Australia and the Tasmanian House of Assembly. The Tasmanian system, referred to as Hare-Clark, differs from the system used for the Senate and States' Upper Houses in a number of ways. However, the basic concepts are the same.

In the Single-Transferable Vote system, voters are required to rank individual candidates according to their preference. A candidate must receive a Droop quota in order to be elected. Any candidates whose first preference votes equal or exceed the quota are declared elected. Votes surplus to the quota cast for successful candidates are transferred amongst the remaining candidates according to the second preferences recorded by the voter. The questions of which votes actually elect the first elected candidate and which votes are surplus and hence distributed can either be resolved by sampling or conducting a full count to determine the proportions favouring particular candidates. The proportions are then applied to the first preference votes of the successful candidate. As each candidate receives a quota he is elected and his surplus votes are distributed. If all surplus votes have been distributed and not all vacancies have been filled then the candidate with the smallest number of votes is eliminated and his votes distributed. This process continues until all vacancies are filled.

The Single-Transferable Vote system can be explained simply in the following terms. If a voter wished to vote for a particular candidate, but the candidate was either so popular as to have no need for his vote or so unpopular as to have no chance of election, then the vote was not wasted but used to elect the voters' second choice candidate.

The need for the Droop quota in the Single-Transferable Vote system may require some explanation. The Droop quota represents the smallest numbers of votes that will ensure election. This can best be illustrated in the case of an election for one vacancy with two candidates. One candidate is required to poll only one more vote than half to ensure election. Thus, with 100 votes, 51 votes would ensure election. Similarly, in a five member constituency, six candidates can each receive one-sixth of the vote, but only five can get any more votes; therefore, any candidate who polls one more vote than one-sixth of the total must be elected. If five candidates receive 17 votes (85 votes in total), then the remaining candidate must receive 15 votes. Thus 17 votes is the smallest number of votes that ensures election. Proportional Representation systems were developed primarily to overcome the weakness of Plurality and Majoritorian systems in providing representation for minority opinions.

Use of proportional representation systems is widespread throughout Western Europe where the political landscape is typified by a large number of political parties. The principal advantage of Proportional Representation is to provide representation to those parties in proportion to their electoral support. Proportional Representation systems thus overcome the main criticism of plurality and majoritorian systems.

Do they really overcome the main criticism?

Some form of Proportional Representation would provide a solution to the problem found in the United Kingdom where the Liberal Social Democratic Alliance polled 22.6% of the vote at the 1987 House of Commons election, yet only won 3.4% of the seats. Democratic principles would suggest that this situation is unfair as nearly one quarter of the electorate is denied representation in the Parliament.

Disadvantages of Proportional Representation

The arguments against Proportional Representation are based on the consequences of the system in providing representation to smaller parties.

First, the proliferation of minor parties in legislatures as a result of proportional representation systems can result in unstable government, and in minor parties being in a balance of power situation.

Second, the election of a number of parties with no one party having a majority in the legislature may result in unstable government and uncertainty as parties trade with each other to form coalitions and alliances.

Third, the behind-the-scenes maneuvering and bargaining can lead to situations where the resultant government follows policies that bear only a slight resemblance to the policies placed before the electorate by the parties concerned. A minor party may be able to take advantage of this situation and hold major parties to ransom by imposing its wishes on the other parties in recompense for its support. In this political environment governments are more susceptible to the whims of party officials rather than the wishes of the electorate.

Fourth, by its very nature it involves large multi-member electorates thus breaching the direct relationship between an electorate and its representative in the legislature.

Fifth, the important electorate-based work undertaken by local representatives may be undermined by the lack of identification by a representative with a defined area.

Sixth, representatives may appear remote from the local constituency and owe their allegiance more to the central party authority than to the local electorate.

4. Mixed Systems

The three types of electoral systems outlined so far in this paper (Plurality, Majoritorian and Proportional Representation) all display a range of advantages and disadvantages. Logic would suggest that the best electoral system should consist of a combination of individual systems so that the disadvantages of one system can be overcome by the advantages of the other and vice versa. Such a combined system is the Additional Member system which is used in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Additional Member system involves the election of individual candidates from single member constituencies and the election of candidates from multi-member constituencies by Proportional Representation. The requirement for direct constituency representation is met by the election of a single member constituency representative, while the requirement for representation of all political opinion is met by the election of representatives under Proportional Representation. In order that the total number of candidates elected is in proportion with the votes cast, the candidate elected under the Proportional Representation component of the system “top-up” candidates elected from single-member constituencies.

Conclusions

Newman tells us, and my reading of the literature confirms it, that there are many voting systems in the world, and an almost infinite number of variations of systems.

There are also many proposed electoral systems that have not as yet found a practical expression. Determining which of the available electoral systems is the best for an electorate is an impossible task. No one electoral system is the best for all countries and in all contexts. A good electoral system can be defined as one that performs a range of tasks reasonably well in a specific context even at the expense of doing none of these tasks superbly well. The range of tasks required of an electoral system includes the requirements listed at the beginning of this paper. Conversely a bad electoral system is one which performs none of these tasks satisfactorily.

Proponents of particular electoral systems maintain that their particular electoral system is the best and all others fail to measure up. However, it should be stressed that there is no such thing as the best electoral system. No single system satisfies all possible requirements. The most appropriate system for an electorate is that system that best satisfies those requirements that are considered to be the most important by the electorate.

You may have noted that the word choice or the notion of choice featured frequently in the descriptions of the above summaries of the different electoral systems.

If democracy implies choice, and choice becomes meaningful only when differences exist, and if we are saying today that our present parliamentary system needs reformation because it is not democratic enough, then a reasonable approach would be to provide more genuine choices through creating more differences.

But how should these differences be created? Between party and party, candidate and candidate, among numerous candidates representing numerous parties?

For example, are there stark philosophical, policy and process differences between the Liberal Party of Canada and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, such that, nation-wide, the voter-electorate's choice of one or the other as the governing party could satisfy the cry for more democracy?

Are there stark philosophical, policy and process differences between the New Democratic Party of Canada, and the Liberal Party of Canada, such that, nation-wide, the voter-electorate's choice of one or the other as the governing party could satisfy the cry for more democracy?

Are there stark philosophical, policy and process differences between the Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada, such that, nation-wide, the voter-electorate's choice of one or the other as the governing party could satisfy the cry for more democracy?

Are there stark philosophical, policy and process differences between the Bloc Quebecois and the Liberals, such that nation-wide, the voter-electorate's choice of one over the other as the governing party satisfies the cry for more democracy?

If the answer to the above questions is, "Yes," then do we need a larger number of representatives to parliament in order to satisfy the electorate’s appetite for democracy?

Given the realities of the "global village" in which political parties in democratically run countries must operate, are there stark differences in philosophy, policy, and process between and among the five recognized parties, such that, nation-wide, the voter-electorate's choice of one over the other as the governing party satisfies the cry for more democracy?

Is it the voting-system, then, that needs to be changed, or is it the differences between one party's philosophy, policies, the application thereof, and others that need to be emphasized so that voters will have more meaningful choice as they use the present voting system?

What other alternatives could be explored while keeping the system that we have now?

If we say that we don't have fair representation, suppose we decided to have two or three representatives from each party elected in each constituency?

What about dividing the provincial constituencies up into smaller areas, thus giving more representation to each area?

If, for example, we are complaining that "the West wants in" are we prepared, irrespective of populations numbers, to apportion as many seats to Alberta and British Columbia as we have done for Ontario and Quebec?

Was the apportionment of seats to provinces not done on the basis of the number of seats being proportionate to the total population of the province?

What about candidate selection? Should any change in the electoral system apply equally to the selection of candidates at the constituency level? Should proportional representation be used in the selection of candidates for each party?

What role do parties play right now in the electoral process?

If the electoral process is being manipulated, how can manipulation be minimized or stopped?

The United States of America, for example, has a House of Representatives with 435 representatives from 435 constituencies in 50 states. Britain has a House of Commons with 650 MPs for 65 constituencies. Relatively small Japan has a House of Representatives with 611 representatives that correspond to 130 constituencies.

Why is it that Britain, the United States of America, and Japan are holding onto the Plurality voting system? Why is it that it works for them?

What can we learn from these three countries that still maintain a Plurality voting system?

There has been a lot of talk about changing to the Proportional Representation system. But before we think of changing, we might want to have a look at how well Proportional Representation has served a relatively small country like Italy, which has a Chamber of 630 Deputies, who come from 31 constituencies. How stable is the Italian government?

Similarly, the relatively small nation of Israel's Knesset has 120 representatives and one constituency. Israel uses a Proportional Representation voting system. How stable is Israel's government? How many governments (PMs) has Israel had in, for example, the last five years?

Germany, a relatively small nation compared to Canada, has a Bundestag comprising 498 members that come from 248 constituencies. Why has Germany not chosen to use the Proportional Representation system only? Why do they still draw on the Plurality system?

All these are questions to which there are no correct answers. Nations have chosen systems that best adapt to their geographic, and population concentrations. In a democratic system, can or should the minority be ever allowed to control the majority?

I leave you with a quote from Ian McLean (1996) who writes:

"It is probably better to restrict democracy narrowly to majority rule, and treat toleration, entrenchment of rights, and so on as preconditions for democracy but not as constitutive of democracy itself."⁷

^Notes

¹ Ian McLean, Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966, p. 130.

² Ibid

³ Gerard Newman, Research Paper No.1989-90, Australian Electoral Commission, Information and Research Services.

⁴ Ibid, p. 4.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid, p. 5.

⁷ Ian McLean, op cit, p. 131f.

Sources Used and Other Readings

Blais, André. "The Debate over Electoral Systems", International Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1991, p. 239-260.

Blais, André and Elizabeth Gidengil, Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views of Canadians, Vol. 17 of the Research Studies, Royal Commission on Electoral Re-form and Party Financing, Toronto, 1991.

Boyer, J. Patrick, Election Law in Canada: The Law and Procedure of Federal, Provincial and Territorial Elections, Toronto: Butterworths, 1987.

Boyer, J. Patrick, Money and Message: The Law Governing Election Financing, Broadcasting and Campaigning in Canada, Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.

Boyer, J. Patrick, Political Rights: The Legal Framework of Elections in Canada, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981.

Boyer, J. Patrick, "The Case for Election Law Reform," Parliamentary Government, 8 (Summer 1989), pp. 13-16.

Courtney, John C., "Recognition of Canadian Political Parties in Parliament and in Law", Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, XI: 1, March/mars 1978.

Encyclopedia of British History: Parliamentary Reform: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ Britain. html.

Freedom House Survey Team, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1991-1992, New York: Freedom House, 1992.

Harewood, W. Glenn, "Democracy, the Law and Human Rights Misunderstood? The Great Ones Clarify", unpublished paper, June 2001.

Interparliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World, Vol. I, 2nd ed., New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986.

Irvine, William P., "Does Canada Need a New Electoral System?” Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1979.

Jackson, Robert and Doreen, Politics in Canada, 2nd ed., Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1990.

Lakeman, Enid, How Democracies Vote: A Study of Elec-toral Systems, London: Faber and Faber, 1974.

Lavoie, Marie and Vincent Lemieux, "The Evaluation of Electoral Systems", Canadian Parliamentary Review, (Win-ter 1983-84), pp. 2-5.

Leonard, Dick and Richard Natkiel, World Atlas of Elections: Voting Patterns in 39 Democracies, London: The Economist Publications, 1986.

Library of Parliament, "Elections in Canada, 1980-1988," Bibliography No. 178.

Library of Parliament, Research Branch, Electoral Rights: Charter of Rights or Freedoms (CIR 90-5).

Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History, 3rd ed., London: Macmillan, 1991.

MacLean v. Attorneys General of Nova Scotia (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 306 (N.S.S.C.).

Mclean, Ian, Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, London: Oxford University Press, 1996.

New Zealand. Electoral Referendum Panel, The Guide to the Electoral Referendum, Wellington, 1992.

Newman, Gerard, Research Paper No. 1989-90 Australian Electoral Commission, Information and Research Services, 1989.

Rose, Richard, ed., Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980.

Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Final Report, 1992.

Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (1995), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 136 (F.C.T.D.).

Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J. No. 515, Appeal No. 14396 (Alta. C.A.).

Response to Dr. W. Glenn Harewood
Dr. Giuseppe Gori, Leader of the
Family Coalition Party of Ontario
" Yes, a more Proportional Representation system will imply more minority governments. This is exactly what many people want. People are tired of false majority governments who do not represent even half of the voters."

It seems to me that Dr. Harewood's presentation on Electoral Reform was a bit biased toward maintaining the status quo. He graciously admitted to have been recently in contact with the President of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and that he is a PC supporter.

Let me explain:

1. His presentation included many details about the various alternative systems, knowing that not even the initiated could not completely follow. He then argued that the system to be used must be simple.

2. His presentation detailed the advantages and disadvantages of the Plurality and the Proportional Representation systems, but only briefly mentioned that there are mixed systems of representation, such as Mixed Member Proportional.

3. He put forward several good points about democracy, but, according to Dr. Harewood, the only idea for improving democracy was to increase the number of MPs (or MPPs). Most people are against "more people at the trough". Why would that be an improvement?

4. He reviewed several systems around the world, showing the number of MPs in other countries and arguing that "smaller" countries like Japan or Italy have twice as many MPs. So Canada might consider increasing the number of its MPs. A closer look at our own setup will show that the proportion of MPs per number of voters is actually higher in Canada. For example, Japan has 611 MPs (twice Canada's) with a population of 180 Million (six times Canada's).

5. In his review of the different systems, he stated that Japan, Germany and New Zealand have the Plurality system. In reality they have switched to a Mixed Member Proportional system.

6. He also argued that these same three countries did not want to go to proportional representation. This is partly true, however, they moved from their previous Plurality system to Mixed Member Proportional system, which is 50% proportional.

7. In his review he never clearly said that Canada and the United States of America are the only democratic countries in the world still using the First-Past-The-Post system. In the United States of America, voters directly elect a number of their positions (including the President). So, in practice, the U.S. uses a mixed system different from Canada.

8. He did not mention that there is a Canadian movement from coast to coast and across the political spectrum to propose electoral reform.

9. He implied that electoral reform is difficult unless the government in power wants to do it. This may be true, but he did not mention that the governments of Prince Edward Island, British Columbia, Quebec and the Yukon Territory are taking steps towards changing the system. He also did not mention that in Ontario Liberal Leader Dalton McGuinty and New Democratic Leader Howard Hampton are both committed to electoral reform.

10. He argued that a system must be easily understood by the people. This is not necessarily a requirement, as voters need to know clearly whom they support, not the rules for the counting process. In addition, he did not do justice to the Proportional Representation system and its variations. They are not that hard to understand, as an example of a Mixed Member Proportional system applied to Ontario provided later on in this response will show.

11. He listed about eight advantages of the current First-Past-The-Post system (with respect to a fully proportional system), but failed to mention that a Mixed system would also have most of these advantages and more, and would not have the disadvantages of the current system.

12. He mentioned that a proportional system leads to a proliferation of small parties. Italy was, as usual, the example. Since the system in Italy did not change substantially since 1948, why then did we have the Christian Democrats in Italy split into three parties about three years ago? Almost immediately, why did the Communist Party, the second largest party in the country, split into three? Obviously the proliferation of parties in Italy is also due to the higher level of interest in politics and ideological differences among the Italian people. In any case, if this is perceived to be a problem (which Italy does not seem to have) the problem is easily fixed: a simple "minimum rule", such as the party must have a minimum of 50 candidates to be officially registered, can do the trick. By the way, this rule is already the law in Canada, federally, and is being fought by Libertarians and citizens' coalitions as undemocratic.

Some Positive Comments about Dr. W. Glenn Harewood’s Views

Yes, a more Proportional Representation system will imply more minority governments. This is exactly what many people want. People are tired of false majority governments who do not represent even half of the voters.

Yes, a more Proportional Representation system will imply more coalition governments. This may be good because a government would be constantly kept under check by a smaller party. In Dr. Harewood's words, the government can be "blackmailed" by a small party. In a democracy, any party (big or small) can play tricks when in power. It is the voters' responsibility to punish that party at election time (or by recalling its members).

Yes, a more Proportional Representation system does elect representatives chosen by the party. This has the following two advantages

1. It clarifies for the electorate the precise function of that elected representative. If he/she has been elected as representing a riding, this person will be less tied to party policy. If elected to represent the party policies, this person represents the party ideology and philosophy. In today's Canada the Prime Minister has control of cabinet and shuts out backbenchers. Who represents the electorate?

2. It is an assurance that the best people representing a party are not lost when they place second in a tight race against another prominent candidate from another party. (We have lost some experienced, honest politicians this way.)

Due to a lack of time, Dr. Harewood was not able to examine the Mixed systems in more detail. In order to compensate for this shortcoming, I would like to put forward my own list of advantages associated with a more Proportional Representation system, such as a Mixed Member Propor-tional system. The list includes the following advantages.

1. No false majority governments. (Still there is a reward for the larger parties. Only in a fully proportional--100% Proportional Representation--system there is no reward for any party, large or small.)

2. The number of MPPs in the Legislature (or MPs in Parliament) would more closely represent the will of the electorate.

3. Maintains local community control (through riding representatives).

4. Gives a voice to large minorities (over a set minimum of 4% or 5% of total votes cast).

5. Does not require by-elections to have a leader sit in the Legislature.

6. Political parties tend to maintain their differences. (This is essential for real democracy. Instead of converging towards the centre of the political spectrum, political parties would provide real choices to the electorate.)

7. Some MPs or MPPs are elected without having to win a riding. These people do not have to make extraordinary promises (which they will not maintain) in order to win.

8. Every voter feels that their vote counts. Even the votes of the people who lost (by not voting for the winner in their riding) are counted to elect the representatives elected proportionally. As a consequence, voters who now tend to vote strategically (for or against the perceived winner) will vote instead for the person and the party that best represents them.

9. The party leaders (presumably the best people parties have to offer) do not have to run in a riding, but are elected out of the proportional lists. This has two advantages:

(a) The Premier (or PM) does not need to go through the motions of running in a specific "safe" riding (usually not where he/she lives).

(b) The Premier (or PM) is not tempted to use his (superior) powers to favour his riding in order to secure his/her re-election (an occasion for corruption).

10. Currently voters feel it as a negative if a party chooses a candidate and puts his/her name on a list (instead of a riding association doing that). However, they are forgetting that, for example in the 1997 election Chrétien by the stroke of the pen replaced ten democratically elected can-didates for the Liberal Party in the Toronto area with ten people of his choice. This was certainly undemocratic. In a more proportional system, such as MMP, the voters can still reject a party list altogether (by not voting for that party). The party list is actually a guarantee that these people are going to stick to the party's promises and the ideology of the party (As we said, greater diversity between parties is an assurance of democracy). If a voter really likes the Liberal Party, would he or she not want an indication that this person is a real Liberal? If not, why would he or she vote Liberal?

11. Voters feel that their vote made a difference. There is a correlation between countries where a more Proportional Representation system exists, and higher voter turnout at elections.

Simple (50% PR) MMP System

To show the simplicity of the Proportional Representation system, I will now explain how a Mixed Member Proportional system might be applied in the province of Ontario.

An Ontario election might be fought in about 51 single-member constituencies, each similar but twice as large as the existing ridings (combination of two contiguous ridings). These would elect 51 MPs much as our present system does.

But another 50 seats would be reserved according to the party's share of the popular vote across Ontario.

For example, if the Liberals received 40% of the total votes across Ontario, they would get another 20 MPPs elected proportionally (40% of 50 available seats = 20) in addition to all Liberal MPPs elected in any of the 51 ridings. The 20 MPPs would be the first 20 on the published party list. (The party list would usually include the party leader as number one).

The election ballot might be maintained as it is today. The party affiliation of the selected candidate would count for the total across Ontario. In this case, to be able to vote, voters would not even have to know that there is a party list. The total number of MPPs (in this example) would be 101.

That's it. Difficult to understand? Would you not know how to vote? Let's see: "Put a cross next to the candidate of your choice".

Existing government coalitions have the support of many more people than any government in Canada or in Ontario have. For example, the current one in New Zealand under MMP has 65% support.

Problems with the Current System

• The current system is undemocratic.

Majority governments with no popular support are created. The last three "majority" governments in Ontario had less than 50% of the popular support. Every vote must count! The current system does not respect minorities.

• The current system creates instability.

Swings between one majority government to another on the opposite side of the political spectrum are common. This creates instability and it is not good for the economy.

• The current system is unfair.

As a result of past elections, some of the parties (including major parties) received considerable voters' support, as a percentage of total number of votes cast, but gained no or little representation in government.

• The current system is antiquated.

The current "single member plurality" was devised for a two-party system. In today's complex society we do not have only left and right to choose from. More choice in government means more accountability.

• The current system encourages deception and fraud.

Politicians are fighting for "all or nothing"; they need to "win at all costs" to be able to represent the voters. Thus, they tend to promise what they cannot deliver, and they tend to look for support from special interest groups, from corporations, from powerful lobbies, etc. Often the elected politicians are not the most experienced, honest and respected, but the most "connected".

Finally, not too long ago, the need for change became a startling reality for PEI Premier Pat Binns who found himself with no Official Opposition during Question Period because Opposition Liberal Leader Ron MacKinley, and the only non-Conservative in the Prince Edward Island Legislature, was home with flu. In the 2000 provincial election, the Conservatives won 26 seats of the Legislature's 27 seats, even though they received only 58% of the popular vote. As a result Mr. Binns has become more open-minded about Proportional Representational. Ironically, it is the one-member Official Opposition that is against Proportional Representation on the grounds that it might make members of the Legislature believe that they are answerable only to the party they represent rather than to their constituents. Of course, this objection can be met simply with a Mixed Member Proportional system which would allow for riding representation while mitigating the faults of the First-Past-The-Post system through proportionally elected representatives.